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FAILED BANKS, COLLECTION ITEMS, AND TRUST
PREFERENCES

By GxORGx GLIEASON BoGRiT*

A

BOUT i,2oo banks failed in the United States during the year
1930, 1 and failures for the years i92I-I929 averaged over 6oo

a year.2 Each of these bank failures doubtless involved several problems regarding collection items. In each case it was almost inevitable that there should be found among the assets in the hands of
the defunct bank several items held for collection but not yet collected, and also that a number of items should have been collected
but no effective remittance made on account of such collection. There
thus arose a series of controversies between the banks or individuals
which had forwarded the items for collection and the receivers or
other representatives of the general creditors of the failed banks.
The purpose of this paper- is to trace the trend of the modem
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago.
'Estimates of Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
2
Bank failures for the years i921 to i929 were as follows: I921, 5o;
1922, 354; 1923, 648; 1924, 776; 1925, 612; 1926, 956; 1927, 662; 1928, 491;
1929, 642; total for the nine years, 5,642. Of these banks 994 were members

of the federal reserve system, and 4,648 were non-members. The total capitalization of these failed banks was $222,823,000. The number having a capital
of less than $25,ooo was 2,204; capitalized at $25,000 were 1,310; $25,ooo to
$50,000, 485; $50,0oo to $oo,ooo, 985; $100,000 to $200,0o0, 404; $200,000 to
$6o,ooo, 144; capitalization figures not available, Io0. Annual Report, Federal
Reserve Board, 1929, pp. 22, 24, 123.
3For other discussion of various aspects of the problem here presented, see
Turner, "Deposits of Demand Paper," 37 YAE L. J. 874; Pierson, "Legislation
Relating to Problems of Check Collection," I6 Am. B. A. J. 4o6; Paton, "Uniform Bank Collection Code," Az& V&,NxzRs' A. J., March, 1929, p. 9o7;
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decisions and statutes regarding thi struggle for preference, and to
advance a theory as to the appropriate placing.of the loss in such a
case. It is not intended to attempt an analysis or reconciliation of
the scores of decisions on preference claims. The authorities are confused, confusing and conflicting: A federal statute for National
Banks and a uniform state law, mutually consistent, .and founded
on a sound economic tleory, are much needed.
For the purpose of: acquiring a simple set of 'terms to be used
in the subsequent discussion, the'following hypothetical case is supposed: D, a depositor in the .first bank, deposits with that bank for
credit to his checkifig account and for collection, a check drawn by
X in favor of D and uton a second bank. The first bank credits
D with the face value-of this check, possibly less a small collection
charge, and forwards the check to the second bank "forcollection and
remittance. The second bank-receives the check and fails, either
after it has charged. the check to X but bef6re taking any steps to
remit to the first bank, or after it has charged -the check to X' and
sent a. draft to the first. bank for the amount of 'the check but before
the payment of that draft. A controversy then arises between the
first bank claiming payment in full of the amount of the check- or
.remittance draft and the receiver of the second bank .claiming that
the first bank must come in as a general creditor.for the amount of
the collected check.' It is, of -course, true that the ordinary collection case is much more 'onplicated than the above hypothetical, case
in that more than two banks are -usually involved, the Federal'Reserve or a clearing house system is -often' implicated, and that special problems sometimes" arise out of the fonrm of indorsements and
out of agreements regarding methods of credit or remittance; but
it is believed that the simple hypothetical case given above will identify the terms' "depositor," "first bank" or "forwarding bank," and
S'"second bank" or "'collecting bank," and will ,raise the necessary
questions which the more complicated cases would also involve, without producing extraneous difficulties.
THr CASiE

LAW

An effort will first be made'to show the trend of the decisions on
Townsend" "Bank Deposits of Commercial Paper," 7 N. Y.UJ . L. Q. RIv.
293, 618; Townsend, "Constructive Trusts and Bank Collections "-39 YALP L.
J. 98o; note 68 A. L. R. 725..
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the preference question. The cases will be divided into two classes,
namely, those decided before i92o when older methods of clearing
and collection were generally in vogue, and those decided since January i, 1920, when more modern methods have been practiced and
when the Federal Reserve system of collections has been in full force
and effect.
A search of the decisions prior to I92O shows that where the
item received for collection was either not 'collected at all, or collected only after the insolvency of the bank holding it for collection,
the result has almost always been the return of the collected paper,
or a preference to the extent of the collection made after insolvency.4
4

Balbach v. Freylinghuysen, x5 Fed. 675 (depositor against receiver of first
bank; check indorsed in blank and immediate credit given); First National
Bank v. Armstrong, 42 Fed. 193 (first bank against receiver of second bank;
indorsed for collection; collection after insolvency); Beal v. City of Somerville, 5o Fed. 647 (depositor against receiver of first bank; indorsed for deposit; collection after insolvency) ; Richardson v. New Orleans Coffee Co., io2
Fed. 785 (depositor against first bank; general indorsement; first bank insolvent when paper received) ; Western German Bank v. Norvell, 134 Fed. 724
(depositor against first bank; indorsed for collection and remittance; paper
received when first bank was insolvent) ; Butler v. Western German Bank, x59
Fed. ix6 (first bank against second bank; paper received by second bank when,
insolvent); Clark Sparks & Sons Mule & Horse Co. v. American National
Banl., 23o Fed. 738 (depositor against second bank; received by second bank
for collection and remittance and collected when second bank insolvent); In
re Jarmulowsky, 249 Fed. 319 (depositor against first bank; indorsed in blank
and credit given but not subject to checkink; collection after receivership);
St. Louis & San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Johnson, i33 U. S. 566 (depositor against
first bank; collection after insolvency) ; Commercial Bank of Pennsylvania v.
Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50 (depositor against first bank; indorsed for collection) ; Lippitt v. Thames Loan & Trust Co., 88 Conn. 185 (first bank against
second bank; indorsed for collection and remittance; collection after insolvency) ; In re State Bank, 56 Minn. iig (depositor against first bank; unrestrictive indorsement); South Park F. & M. 'Co. v. Chicago G. W. Ry. Co.,
75 Minn. 186 (depositor against first bank; unrestrictiv'e indorsement; provisional credit received); National Butchers & Drovers. Bank v. Hubbell, 117
N. Y. 384 (first bank against second-bank; indorsed for-collection; collection
by receiver of second bank) ; Scott v. Ocean Bank of New York, 23 N. Y. 289
(depositor against second bank); Jones v. Kilbreth, 49 Ohio St. 401 (depositor
against first bank; deposited- for collection ; collected after insolvency); Alleman v. Sayre, 79 W. Va. 763 (depositor against firsf bank; collection after
failure). In Illinois Trust & Savings. Bank v. First National Bank, 15 Fed.
858, there was collection after insolveifcyY and would have been a'preference
if tracing had been possible.
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The second bank has been generally regarded as an agent, bailee, or
trustee, holding the paper. Insolvency has been held to revoke the
authority of the collecting fiduciary and to make subsequent collection a wrongful act on which a constructive trust could be based.
Only in cases of peculiar endorsements or other special conditions
has the second bank been regarded as the purchaser or owner of
such paper, 5 and so under no duty to return it after insolvency.
In the numerous cases decided prior to 192o where the second
bank had collected the item before insol,*ency but had not credited
the forwarding bank or remitted to it, there seems to be a slight
majority of decisions and jurisdiciions against allowing the forwarding bank a preference. Sometimes the reason given for refusing
a. preference was that no trust or other similar relation with regard
to the proceeds was intended.6 Sometimes the courts contented themWFirst National Bank v. Armstrong, 39 Fed. 231 (first bank against second bank; indorsed for collection; credit given; second bank a purchaser);
Cronheim v. Postal Telegraph-Cible Co., io Ga. App. 716 (depositor against
first bank; for collection; collection after insolvency; first bank deemed debtor
merely) ; and see Hoffman v. First National Bank of Jersey City, 46 N. J. L.
6o4, and Metropolitan National Bank v. Loyd, 9o N. Y. 530, which were cases
of general indorsement and immediate credit and which were decided on a
theory which would seem to prevent recovery of the item by the depositor
because the first bank had been a purchaser.
As to the meaning of a restrictive indorsement and the powers of such
an indorsee, see N. I. L., secs. 36, 37.
6
Bank of Commerce v. Russell, Fed. Cas. 884 (item forwarded for collection and draft sent back- but not honored); Merchants & Farmers Bank v.
Austin, 48 Fed. 25 (for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance);
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Clayton, 56 Fed. 759 (for collection and
return; remittance draft unpaid); First National Bank v. Wilmington & W.
R. Co., 77 Fed. 4o (for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance) ;
San Francisco Nat. Bank v. American Nat. Bank, 5 Cal. App. 408 (for collection; no attempted remittarice) ; Gonyer v. Williams, 168 Cal. 452 (depositor
against first bank; indorsement in blank and credit given) ; Lippett v. Thames
Loan & Trust Co., 88 Cofin. i85 (collection and remittance; no attempted
remittance) ; Citizens Nat. Bk. v. Haynes, i44 Ga. 490 (for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance) ; United States National Bank v. Glanton,
146 Ga. 786 (for collection; 'remittance check unpaid) ; Union National Bank
v. Citizens Bank, I53 Ind. 44 (for collection and remittance; remittance draft
unpaid); American National Bank v. Owensboro S. B. & T. Co.'s Receiver,
146 Ky. 194 (for collection) ; Young v. Teutonia Bank & Trust Co., 134 La.
879 (for collection and remittance; remittance draft unpaid) ; Billingsley v.
Pollock, 69 Miss. 759 (for collection; remittance draft unpaid); Alexander
County Nat. Bk. v. Conner, iio Miss. 653 (for collection; remittance draft
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selves with stressing the fact that, even if a trust was intended, no
preference could be given because of the inability to trace the proceeds of the collection. 7 In a very considerable' number of jurisdictions, however, a preference was given to the forwarding bank, usually on a trust theory.8
unpaid) ; People v. Merchants & Mechanics Bk., 78 N. Y. 269 (for collection
and remittance; remittance draft unpaid) ; People v. City Bank of Rochester,
93 N. Y. 582 (for collection; credited on mutual account); National Butchers
& Drovers Bank v. Hubbell, 117 N. Y. 384 (for collection and credit; credited
on mutual account); Corporation Commission v. Bank, 137 N. C. 697 (for
collection) ; First National Bank v. Davis, ii4 N. C. 343 (for collection with
agreement for daily remittance; no attempted remittance); Commercial &
Farmers Nat. Bk. v. Davis, 115 N. C. 226 (for collection and remittance; no
attempted remittance); McCormick Harvesting Machine Co. v. Yankton Say.
Bk., I5 S. D. 196 (for collection and remittance; remittance to be at intervals; no attempted remittance); Akin v. Johes, 93 Tenn. 353 (for collection;
remittance draft unpaid); Sayles v. Cox, 95 Tenn. 579 (for collection and
remittance; no attempted remittance); Peters Shoe Co. v. Murray, 31 Tex.
Civ. App. 259 (for collection and remittance; draft in remittance unpaid);
Bowman v. First National Bank, 9 Wash. 614 (for collection and remittance;
remittance draft unpaid); Hallam v. Tillinghast, ig Wash. 20 (for collection;
no attempted remittance).
7
Philadelphia National Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed. x72; Nixon State' Bank
v. First State Bank, i8o Ala. 291; Lummus Cotton Gin Co. v. Walker, i95
Ala. 552; J. Allen Smith Co. v. Montgomery, 95 So. 29o; Ober & Sons Co.
v. Cochran, I i8 Ga. 396; In re Seven Comers Bank, 58 Minn. 5; Midland
National Bank v. Brightwell, 148 Mo. 358; Frank v. Bingham, 58 Hun. (N. Y.)
58o; White v. Bank, 6o S. C. i22; Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237.
8
First National Bank v. Armstrong, 36 Fed. 59 (collecting bank earmarked
part of its cash as representing collection); Boone County National Bank v.
Latimer, 67 Fed. 27 (for collection and remittance; cash proceeds of collection mingled with other cash and balance of cash exceeded amount of collection); Holder v. Western German Bank, 132 Fed. 187 (for collection and
remittance by New York exchange; no attempted remittance), see also 136
Fed. go; American Can Company v. Williams, 178 Fed. 42o (for collection) ;
Titlow v. McCormick, 236 Fed. 2o9 (for collection; proceeds traced into credit
of collector at another bank); State National Bank v. First National Bank,
i24 Ark. 531 (for collection; collector received no benefit except cancellation
of its debt to a depositor) ; Henderson v. O'Conor, io6 Cal. 385 (for collection; collector had received benefit in form of increased credit in another
bank) ; First National Bank v. Hummel, 14 Colo. 259 (for collection and remittance; cash collection proceeds imixed with other cash and no remittance) ;
National Life Ins, Co. v. Mather, 118 Ill. App. 491 (for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance); Nurse v. Satterlee, 81 Iowa 491 (for collection; preference although collector had credited depositor on its books);
Kansas State Bank v. First National State Bank, 62 Kan. 788 (for collection
and remittance; seems to be decided on the exploded "swelling of assets" the-
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The decisions since 1920 with regard to uncollected paper, or
paper collected after, insolvency, are generally in favor of its return
to, or a preference for, the forwarding bank, 9 although occasionally
the form of endorsement has been held to make the second bank a
purchaser, subject to no duty to return. 10
In the decisions of the last ten years regarding items collected
by the failed bank but not credited or remitted for prior to insolvency, there seems to be an increasing tendency to allow a preferory) ; Sherwood v. Central Michigan Savings Bank, 103 Mich. 1og (for collection and notification; improper credit to depositor on 'books); Wallace v.
Stone, 107 Mich. 19o (for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance);
Ryan v. Paine, 66 Miss. 678 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance unsuccessful) ; German Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimble, 66 Mo. App. 370 (for
collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Guignon v. First
National Bank, 22 Mont. 14o (to credit and notify; collecting bank had received credit td amount of collection) ; Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n v. Morris, 36 Neb. 31 (form of indorsement not given) ; Griffin v. Chase, 36 Neb.
328 (for collection and remittance; tracing not discussed) ; Thompson v. Gloucester City Savings Inst., 8 AtI. 97 (for collection; no strict tracing rules
followed); First National Bank v. Dennis, 2o N. M. 96 (for collection and
remittance; no attempted remittance); Arnot v. Bingham, 55 Hun (N. Y.)
553 (for collection; collecting bank received and cancelled check on itself in
collecting); Warren-Scharf Paving Co. v..Dunn, 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 205 (for
collection; proceeds traced into chose in favor of collector) ; Blair v. Hill, 50
App. Div. (N. Y.) 33 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance unsuccessful); Mad River National Bank v. Melhorn, 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 19I (1894)
*(for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective); Plano Mfg.
Co. v. Auld, 14 S. D. 512 (for collection; no credit or remittance) ; Bank of
Sherman v. Weiss, 67 Tex. 331 (for collection; no attempted remittance) ; Continental National Bank v. Weems, 69 Tex. 489 (for collection and return of
proce ds intact); Hunt v. Townsend, 26 S.W. 31o .(for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance); First National Bank v. Union Trust Co.,
,55 S.W. 989 (for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance) ; Foster
v.. Rincker, 35 Pac. 47o (for collection; remittance attempted).
9In all the following cases the bank received the paper for collection after
its officers knew it was insolvent: FederAl Reserve Bank v. Idaho Grimm
Alfalfa Seed Grain Ass'n, 8 F.(2d) 922; Marvin v. Martin, 2o F.(2d) 746;
Hollway v. Dykes, 29 F.(2d) 430; Ellerbe v. Studebaker Corp. of America,
21 F. (2d) -993. In Salem Elevator Works v. Commissioner of Banks, 252
Mass. 366, a collection after insolvency would have resulted in a preference,
iftracing could have been made out.
' 0 In the following cases a general indorsement and immediate credit, although subject to cancellation, made the transaction a purchase of the paper:
Bryant v. Williams, 16 F.(2d) 159; Ashley State Bank v. City National Bank,
32 F.(2d) 166.
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ence to the -forwarding bank, even without the aid of a statute," but
-Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. U. S. Steel Products Co., 29o Fed. 884
(for collection and return; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Bank of Metropolis v. First National Bank, 19 F.(2d) 3ox (for collection; collection but no remiftance or credit); Peoples National Bank v. Moore, 25 F.(2d) 599 (for
collection and remittance; attempted remittance); Monticello Hardware Co.
v. Weston, 28 F.(2d) 672 (for collection; attempted remittance); Washington Loan & Banking Co. v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 38 F.(2d) 772 (for collection
and credit; collecting bank had received credit for item); Hanover National
Bank v. Thomas, 117 So. 42 (for collection and credit) ; Rainwater v. Federal Reserve Bank, 172 Ark. 631 (for collection and remittance; attempted
remittance ineffective); Atlantic National Bank v. .Pratt, 1i6 So. 635 (for
collection and remittance; attempted remittance) ; Tunnicliffe v. City National
Bank & Trust Co., i18 So. 319 (like next preceding case) ; Edwards v. Lewis,
124 So. 746 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective);
Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective); Krueger V. First National Bank, 217 Ill. App. i8, (dictum) ; People v. Iuka State Bank, 229 Ill. 4 (for collection and return; no
remittance attempted) ; Murray v. North Liberty Savings Bank, 196 Iowa 729
(for collection and remittance; credit given); Leach v. Iowa State Savings
Bank, 212 N. W. 748, rehearing 215 N.W. 728 (to collect interest on mortgages and remit) ; Andrew v. State Bank of Dexter, 215 N.W. 742 (for collection; no remittance attempted); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover
State Bank, io9 Karn. 772 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance
ineffective) ; Kesl v. H-anover State Bank, rog Kan. 776 (for collection and
remittance; attempted remittance- ineffective); Griffith v. Burlington State
Bank, 277 Pa'c. 42 (for collection and return; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Sabine Canal Co. v. Crowley Trust & Savings Bank, 164 La. 33 (for
collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffectual); Eifel v. Veigel,
i6g Minn. 281 (for collection; no remittance) ; Emerson v. Veigel, 176 Minn.
584 (to collect price of land; unauthorized credit to forwarder); Bauck v.
Beigel, 225 N.W. 916 (for collection; remittance ineffective) ; National Shawmut Bank v. Barnwell, 140 Miss. 816 (for collection and credit; forwarder
insolvent before credit given) ; Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh, 282 S.W.
7o6 (for collection and remittance by currency or draft; draft remittance not
honored) ; Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, 313 Mo. 412 (to collect and
credit); Federal Reserve Bank v. Quigley, 284 S.W. 164 (for collection and
remittance; attempted remittance ineffective); State v. Banking Corporation
of Montana,, 77 Mont. 134 (for collection) ; Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne,
69 Mont. i4o (for collection and remittance; remittance draft not honored);
State v. Banking Corporation of Montana, 74 Mont. 491 (for collection and
credit) ; McDonald v. American Bank & Trust Co., 255 Pac. 733 (for collection and notification; no notification or credit) ; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Tierney, 27o Pac. 792 (for collection and remittance; remittance draft never paid) ;
Matter of Bank of Cuba, 198 App. Div. (N. Y.) 733 (for collection and remittance; no remittance attempted) ; Blair v. Union Savings Bank, 62 N.E. 423
(for collection; remittance ineffective) ; Thomas v. Mothersead, 128 Okla. 157
(for collection and remittance; remittance draft not honored) ; First State Bank.
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the decisions are quite evenly divided. 12
v. O'Bannon, 266 Pac. 472 (for collection and remittance; remittance draft
not honored); State v. Excello Feed Milling Co., r3i Okla. ioo (for collection and remittance; remittance draft not honored) ; Yeldell v. Peoples Bank,
1o S.E. 789 (for collection and remittance); Schimke v. Smith, 211 N.W.
461 (for collection and remittance in specie) ; Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters,
139 Va. 45 (for collection and remittance; remittance draft not honored);
Central Trust Co. v. Mullens, ISO S.E. 137 (for collection and remittance;
remittance draft not honored); Central Trust Co. v. Mullens, 153 S.E. 145
(same as next preceding case; based on equitable assignment theory); Vermont Loan & Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 26o Pac. 534 (for collection
and remittance; remittance draft not paid) ; Lusk Development and Imp. Co.
v. Giinther, 32 Wyo. 294 (to collect price of land; draft not paid).
12In the following cases there was no preference granted because of a
lack of intent to have a trust of the proceeds of the collection: Bishop v. United
States, 16 F.(2d) 4o6; Dickson v. First National Bank, 26 F.(2d) 411;
Wrightsville & T. R. Co. v. Citizens & S. National Bank, 36 F.(2d) 736;
Equitable Trust Co. v. Rochling, 48 Sup. Ct. 58 (for account of another then
forwarder; credit established) ; Latzko v. Equitable Trust Co., 48 Sup. Ct. 6o;
City of Douglas v. Federal Reserve Bank, 46 Sup. Ct. 554 (senzble) ; Farmers
& Merchants Bank v. State, 23 S.W.(2d) 624; Head v. Mobley, 152 S.E. 473;
Leach v. Citizens State Bank, 211 N.W. 522 (for collection and remittance;
attempted remittance failed); Leach v. Battle Creek Savings Bank, 2o2 Iowa
871 (for collection and credit; no credit made); Leach v. Iowa State Bank,
202 Iowa 875 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Colorado & S. Ry. v. Docking, 124 Kan. 48 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Massey-Harris Harvester Co. v. First
State Bank, i22 Kan. 483 (for collection; attempted settlement ineffective);
Lawrence v. Lincoln County Trust Co., 125 Me. i5o (for collection and credit;
credit accomplished); Central Trust Co. v. Hanover Trust Co., 242 Mass.
265 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ; HeckerJones-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. i8I (for collection and remittance; no attempted remittance)"- Love v. Federal Land Bank,
I27 So. 72o (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ;
May v. Bank of Hughesville, 291 S.W. 170 (for deposit and credit; credit
given); California Packing Corp. v. McClintock, 75 Mont. 72 (for collection
and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ; State v. McKinley County
Bank, 252 Pac. 98o (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ; North Carolina Corp. Com'n v. Bank of Hamley, 135 S.E. 342 (for
collection only; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Citizens Bank of Pinewood
v. Bradley, 134 S.E. 510 (for collection and remittance; attempted remittance
ineffective) ; Fant v. Dinkins, 149 S.C. 363 (for collection; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Ryer Grain Co. v. American Security Bank, 147 Wash. 42
(for collection and remittance; attempted remittance ineffective) ; Citizens State
Bank v. Spokane & Eastern Trust Co., 143 Wash. 9 (for collection and return).
In the following cases the emphasis in refusing a preference was on inability to trace: Nyssa-Arcadia Drainage Dist. v. First National Bank, 3
F.(2d) 648; Larabee Flour Mills v. First National Bank, 13 F.(2d) 330;
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COLLECTION PMCCTICE

A great deal might be said with regard to the collection system
in vogue in this country before the inauguration of the Federal Reserve system and thereafter. 3 Undoubtedly prior to 1913 the collection system was based on decentralized reserves, was greatly lacldng
in uniformity, did not generally involve the practice of direct routing, and was founded partly on an attempt by forwarding banks to
avoid the payment of collection fees. Under the Federal Reserve
system, the Federal Reserve banks and Federal Reserve board have,
of course, been used to a very large extent as clearing houses for
all member and some non-member banks. The city clearing houses
have handled local items to an increasing extent. There has remained, however, a large group of miscellaneous collection items
handled in a variety of ways. Direct routing is becoming an approved
practice. 14 In some cases credit and debit for collection items have
Farmers National Bank v. Pribble, 15 F.(2d) 175; Smith Reduction Corp. v.
Williams, 15 F.(2d) 874; First National Bank v. Williams, 15 F.(2d) 585;
Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour & Feed Co., 25 F.(2d) 44o; Burnes National Bank
v. Spurway, 28 F.(2d) 40; Steele Briggs Seed Co. v. Spurway, 28 F.(2d)
42; Early & Daniel Co. v. Pearson, 36 F.(2d) 732; Rainwater v. Wildman,
172 Ark. 521; National Bank of the Republic v. Porter, 258 Pac. 544; Andrew
v. Darrow Trust & Savings Bank, 217 N.W. 438; Andrew v. Hamilton County
State Bank, 223 N.W. 176; State v. Citizens Bank, 22o N.W. 593; H'all v.
Sullivan, 123 Okla. 233; Northwestern National Bank v. James Valley Bank,
221 N.W. 82; Farmers State Bank v. Smith, 222 N.W. 143.
llKNIPPIN,

COMMERCIAL BANKING,

Ch.

XIII;

W.STEI2ItLD,

BANKING

PIUNCIPLES AND PR)cLxcT,
Ch. XVI and XVII; LANGSTON, BANKING PRACTICE, p. 162; SPAuR, THE CLEARING AND COLLECTION O CHEcKs, Ch. III,
IV, VI, X,, XIII; WILLIs AND STEINER, FEDERAL, RsERvE BANKING PRACTMCZ
p. 598.
' 4For the older view that direct routing was improper, see National Reserve Bank v. National Bank of the Republic, 172 N. Y. IO2. The American
Bankers' Association prepared a short statute to permit forwarding paper direct
to the payor, and this has been adopted in a number of -states without modification. Ala. Code 1923, sec. 9222; Ga. Code 1926 Annot±ated see. 2366 (182) ;
Idaho L. x925, c. 333, sec. 93; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1925, c. 98, sec. 95; Me. L. 1923,
c. 350, sec. 4; Mich. L. i939, N . 386; Nev. L. i19, c. 127, p. 242; N. C. L.
1921, c. 4, sec. 39; Ohio Gen. Code 1921, sec. 70-333; S. D. L. 3919, c. 137;
Utah L. 3925, c. 3. And in others in modified form. Miss. L. i926, c. 246;
Or. Supp. 1927, P. 3383; Va. L. 1928, c. 507; W. Va. L. 1925, c. 32; Wyo. L.
1927, c. ioo, sec. 47. Some other states have similar legislation. Ark. Acts
of 1921, Act 496, sec. 14; Cal. L. 1925, c. 312, sec. 5; Minn. L. 1927, c. 338;
Mont. L. 1927, c. 89, sec. 89; N. D. L. 1927, c. 92. The American Bankers
Association Collection Code (sec. 6) expressly authorizes direct routing and is
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been given before collection, siabject- to cancellation; while in other
cases no debit or credit has been made until collection.
The only really vital element in the banking practice regarding
collections so far as this paper is concerned would seem to be the
practice regarding the disposal of the proceeds of the collection and
regarding the method of credit or remittance by the collecting bank.
That practice, both before I9I3 and since, in almost all cases, has
undoubtedly been based upon (i) a privilege in the collector to dispose of the proceeds of the collection in any way he pleased, and
(2) upon a duty to remit to or credit the forwarder by effecting
an increase .in the forwarder's credit out of any of the collector's
property.
The. collector has usually received the benefit of the collection by
charging the account of one of its depositors and thus reducing one
of its (the collector's) debts, or by receiving cash which it was at
once at liberty to use as its own absolute property, or by receiving
a check or draft on a third party which the collector was at liberty
to use, and did use, to pay its debts to others or to establish credit
for itself elsewhere. -There has been no duty or custom to convert
the exact proceeds of the collection (if any proceeds could be found)
into a credit or paper in favor of the forwarding bank.
The credit or remittance to the forwarding bank, intended to
compensate it and make it whole, has- been generally accomplished
either by a mere bookkeeping entry in favor of the forwarding bank
on a joint account between forwarding and collecting bank, or by
a similar entry in favor of a correspondent of the forwarding bank,
or by sending the forwarding bank a check or draft which it could
use to establish credit for itself. In very few cases has there been
any requirement or custom that the source of the credit passed on
to the forwarding bank should be the benefit received by the collecting bank as a result of the collection. Contract and custom have
permitted that source to be any of the assets of the collecting bank.
Many cases make a distinction between "for collection and credit"
and "for collection and remittance," giving a preference in the latin force in eleven states. See footnotes 25 and 26, post. The proposed Uniform Bank Collection Code of the Commissioners on Uniform Laws (sec. 4)
authorizes direct routing, as does also Regulation J of the.Federal Reserve
Board regarding Clearing and Collection. See also Comp. L. Fla. 1927, sec.

6834, to the same effect.
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ter case but not in the former. To the writer this seems an illogical
distinction. In both cases the collector can do what he likes with
the proceeds of the collection. In both cases he can pay the forwarder out of any assets. Until credit or remittance, there is a debt
from collector to forwarder and no effort to pay it. After credit
and before payment there is a mere. bookkeeping note of the debt,
but no step to pay. After attempted remittance but before collection of the remittance paper, there is a mere debt with steps taken
by the debtor to effect payment, but, still no payment. A creditor
almost paid ought to be no better off than any other creditor.
RCEN'T STATIU'TORY CUANGES

In the past few years eighteen state legislatures have enacted
statutes creating preferences against failed banks in collection cases.
In 1919 the Georgia legislature 5 provided for a "lien" on all the
assets of the failed bank where an item had been sent for -collection
and remittance, collection had occurred and no remittance had been
made, or the remittance was ineffective.
In 1925 Colorado by statute" gave a preference to the first or forwarding bank against the second or collecting bank, where the latter had collected and issued.a draft in remittance which was not paid.
In 1926 Louisiana adopted an actJ7 giving the depositor a preference against his bank when it had received the benefit of a collection
item and failed without having credited the depositor. This statute
also gave a preference to the first or forwarding bank against the
second or collecting bank when the second had collected and issued
a check or draft by way of remittance but the check or draft proved
ineffective, due to the failure of the collecting bank.
North Carolina in 1927 enacted a statute's giving a lien on the
assets of a failed collecting bank, where the item was sent for collection and remittance, collection was made, but there was no attempt
at remittance or the paper sent in remittance was never paid.
15 Ga.

Ann. Code

' 6 Colo. L.

1'La. L.

1926,

sec.

2366.

1925, c. 63.
1926, no. 63.

18C. ix3, L. 1927; see N. C. Banking Law, c. 113, sec. i (4);
cussion in 6 N. C. L. R'v. 174.
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In 1927 South Carolina adopted an act 19 giving a preference to
the first bank against the second bank in all cases, both before and
after collection. Thiis statute has since been superseded by the Amer20
ican Bankers' Association Code referred to later.
In 1927 Utah passed a law 21 giving a preference to. the first bank
against the second bank when paper has been received by the second bank for collection and, remittance or payment, the paper has
been collected and an ineffectual attempt has been made to remit by
check, draft, or an auth6rizaton to a correspondent to charge an
account.
In 1929 the Iowa legislature 22 created a preference by statute in
favor of the holder of any draft or cashier's check issued against
acttal existing values by any bank prior to its failure and given in
payment of clearirgs.
In 1929 a Wyoming statute 2 was adopted giving a preference
in favor of the holder of checks, drafts, or other instruments issued
in payment of collection items.
In 1929 The American Bankers' Association adopted2 4 and urged
upon the state legislatures a collection code which was enacted by
nine states in that year 25 and by two states in 1930.26 The principal provisions of this code insofar as the subject of this article is
concerned, are as follows: banks holding paper for collection are
deemed to be agents of the depositor or forwarder; a bank failing
with collected paper in its hands is under a duty to return the paper
to the party from whom it received .the paper; if the second bank
is the drawee or payor bank, and has collected the item by charging its customer's account but does not settle in money or in unconditional credit on its books or the books of another bank, and fails,
a preference against all the assets of the failed bank on a trust the19S. C.

Acts 1927, no.

20
See footnote 25,
22
Utah L. 1927, c.
22

2o2.

post.
49.
Iowa L. 1929, c. 30, sec. II.
23Wyo. L. 1929, c. 141, secs. 1-3.
24
See Paton, Am. BANKxRS' A. J., March 1929, p. 207, and 46 BANKING
L. J.255o8; and 43 -ARv. L. Rv. 307.
Ind. L. r92g, c. 164; Mo. L. 1929, p. 2o5; Neb. L. 1929, c. 41; N. M. L.
1929, c. 138; N. Y. L. 1929, c. 589; Wash. L. 1929, c. 203; Md. L. 1929, c.
454; N. J. L.

2929,

c. 270; Wis. L. 1929, c. 354.

26Ky. Acts 1930, c. 13; S. C. Acts

293o,

no. 822.
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ory is given in favor of the forwarder of the item; if the second
bank is not a drawee or payor bank but collects and does not remit
by money' or unconditional credit established in favor of the forwarding bank, and fails, there is a preference against all the assets
of the collecting bank on a trust theory in favor of the owner of
the item. No tracing or identification of proceeds is required.
For the past two years the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has been engaged in drawing a collection code covering the subject in question, the draftsman of the code
being Professor Turner of Yale.2 7 Two drafts of this code have
now been considered by the Conference and final approval of the code
at the 1931 meeting is a possibility. This proposed uniform code
makes an effort to establish the first bank as a purchaser of the
paper in nearly all cases and the second bank as an agent.2 It contains no' provision regarding uncollected paper. It gives a preference out of all the assets of the failed collecting bank except fixed
assets, where the collecting bank has received an item for remittance,
has obtained the benefit of the collection by charging its customer's
account or otherwise, and has not remitted. The preference is based
on a trust theory and runs in favor of prior parties as their interests
may appear, 2 9 without any requirement of tracing or identification.
Another effort on the part of the American Bankers' Association
affecting the question under discussion should be noticed. Counsel
for that Association have prepared a uniform deposit slip agreement
to be printed on each deposit ticket for the purpose of binding depositors to certain conditions. 0 -The principal features of this uniform agreement are that items received for deposit or collection are
received as agent, that credit given the customer is subject to final
payment of the item, that the receiving bank is under no liability
for the acts of correspondents or for losses iri transit, that direct
forwarding is allowed, that the collecting bank may remit by its
draft or credit in lieu of cash, and that the receiving bank may charge
27Handbook, Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1929,
136, 249; Handbook, Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
-1930, pp. r48, 3o4.
28

Secs.

22-28,

x93 o draft.

2-Sec. 32, 1930 draft.
$0I

PAToN's DIoMST

Ov BANKING LAW,

par. 1446.
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back the item before fihal payment. According to the view of c6unsel for the Association, a large -proportion of the banks of the coufntry have adopated substantially- this form."' An examination of a
limited number of deposit 4ljps seems to confirm this estimate of Mr.
Paton22 The principal present impQrtance of this uniform deposit
slip agreement. would seem to be that it tends to "confirm the general understanding that there is a 1privilege on the part of the collect.ing bank to remit but of any of its assets and thus' contradicts the
notion of a strict trust as to the proceeds of the collection.
Aniuhsucdessful effort was made by Representative Strong of
Kansas .to 'secure the adoption by Congress about a year ago of a
preference statute affecting -national banks, which have collected
-items. 3 .itsought to give a preference'out of all the Iassets "oni a
preferred-debt theory, but only in the case where 'the item Was connected with a document of title affecting real or personal property.
A study of 'the decisions, statutes, and proposed statutes referred
to above will show, it is believed, a rather striking tendency to give
a preference to the depositor or forwarder of -the collection item at
the expense of the general creditors of the failed -bank. The next
question to be considered is whether -this preference can be justified
on legal or economic theori'e
Is THl

PR wRmNCx

REASONABLE ON THa

INTENT OV Tlan

BASIS OV THrE

PARTMzs?

Itwould be possible to justify a preference in favor of the forwarder of the collection item on 'a theory of the intent of the depositor, forwarder and collector, if such intent were actually expressed1
and were sought to be accomplished in a legal manner. The parties
could, for example, express an intent that the proceeds of the collection in the form of coins, bills, commercial pap&, or credit should
3'private letter from Thomas B. Paton, Jr., assistant General Counsel,
American Bankers' Association.
82By the kindness of the writer's students 'and othe friends, he was able
to collect deposit slips from 34 banks. Of these 27 had printed conditions upon
them 'similar to the bankers' standard form. Thirteen of these were from
Chicago, five from Minnesota, eight from Indiana, and one from -Massachusetts.
Seven others had no printed conditions upon them. In this latter group were
five from
Chicago, one from Minnesota, and one from Massachusetts.
3
H. R. 5634, intrduced Dec. 2, 1929, and referred to the Committee on
Banking and Currency.
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be held in strict trust and that such proceeds, or their successors,
should be remitted to the forwarder or depositor. As previously
stated, however, it seems impossible to find any such trust intent.
Custom, the deposit slips, and the transit letters accompanying the
paper show that the parties actually intend a remittance by means
of increasing the forwarder's credit out of any of the collector's
assets. The trust institution has long been based on the theory of
the necessity. of 9 specific equitable interest in a specific thing as a
basis for its existence. 3' To establish a rule by decision or statute
that a trust can exist without definite subject-matter, or to create fictions about subject-matter and state that it exists where in fact it
does not, is vicious in that it makes the law uncertain and contradictory. The collection problem can be solved without recognizing
a trust .without a res, and thus injuring the integrity of the trust
institution.
Even if the parties actually intended a trust of the collection pro-'
.ceeds, there "could usually be no preference if strict principles of
tracing were followed. The collecting bank commonly receives the
benefit of the collection by the concellation of one of-its debts to a
depositor or to a correspondent. The cancellation of a debt leaves
no property interest which can be a trust subject-matter. The rei5
sult of the cancellation of a debt' is purely negative.
The preceding paragraphs regarding a possible trust-intent the-.
ory for preference have been based on*the idea of an express trust.
It may be urged that a constructive trust ,would be a satisfactory
basis for giving the preference. Such a trust would not, of course,
be established on the intent of the parties but rather on an inequitable
holding by the collecting bank of a specific interest in a specific
thing.386 Here again the lack of any specific coins, bills, comlmercial
paper, or credit inequitably obtained or-held, by-the collecting bank
as a result of the collection is, in the great majority of cases, obvious. The parties do not intend that the collector shall make any.
particular disposition of the proceeds of the collection or satisfy its
" 4Burke v. Burke,

259

Ill. 262; Gough v. Satterlee,

32

App. Div. (N. Y.)

•33, 40.

81Mechanics & Metals Nat Bk. v. Buchanan, x2 F. (2d) 891; Steele Briggs
Seed" Co. v. Spurway, 28 F.(2d) 42.
ssMaltbie v. Olds, 88 Conn. 633; Miller v. Miller, 266 Il. 822.
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duty to the forwarder out of any particular source. A constructive
trust requires definite subject-matter just as much as an express trust.
It may be urged that a preference could be given on an equitable
lien theor , based on the intention of the parties. Equitable liens
are rather 'vague interests which sometimes purport to be founded
on an actual intent of the parties to have an equitable lien, sometimes on a frustrated intent to have a legal lien, and sometimes on
more vague general equities.37 Insofar as it is sought to give a preference to the forwarding bank on a theory that the parties intended
part or all ,of the assets of the collecting bank to be subject to a
lien in favor of the forwarding bank, the position seems untenable
because of the failure of the parties to manifest any such desire.
By all their written and spoken words, and by all their other conduct and customs, they dearly manifest an intent to have all the
assets of the collector free of any lien or in rem claim in favor of
the forwarder, and to have the benefit of the collection flow back
to the forwarder out of any of the assets of the collector.
It may be urged that a preference could be awarded on the basis
of an equitable assignment, where the collecting bank has attempted
to remit by check or draft, but the check or draft is dishonored on
account of the failure of the collecting bank. Prior to the adoption
of the Negotiable Instruments Law there was a minority view that
a check or draft could of itself constitute an assignment of a part
of the chose in action against the payor or drawee.38 These early
views may have influenced some of the early collection item cases,
but, since the'universal adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law,
it has usually been clear that the mere making and delivery of a
check or draft does not constitute a partial assignment of the chose
in action on which it is drawn.3 9 In actuality the collector remitting
37For examples of equitable liens based on actual intent, see In re Farmers
170 Fed. 502; Westall v. Wood, 212 Mass. 54o. For cases where
there was no expressed or implied intent for security but chancery regarded
it as equitable that certain property of the debtor should stand as security, see
Kline v. Cofield, 159 Ky. 744; Elterman v. Hyman, i92 N. Y. 113; Town of
Covington v. Hayden, 27 F.(2d) 36o. For a good discussion of .equitable liens
see, Britton, "Equitable Liens," 8 N. C. L. RP. 388.
38For some citations see 37 YAL L. J. 626; Brannon, Neg. Inst. Law Ann.
(3d ed.), pP. 356, 403; 5 U. L. A. 708; 5 C. J. 9,7, 9,9.

Supply Co.,

39N. I. L., see.

127,

i89.

HeinOnline -- 29 Mich. L. Rev. 560 1930-1931

FAILED BANKS AND PREFERENCES

by check or draft never contemplates making the forwarder partowner of a chose in action against the payor or drawee of the check
or draft.. it intends to give the forwarder power to acquire cash or
credit by the use of the check or draft on presentation of it to the
payor or drawee bank. It is believed that the exceedingly cumbersome result of temporary co-6wnership of a chose in action is in
reality never contemplated or desired.
It would be obviously impossible to justify the preference for
the forwarding bank on the basis of intent of the parties if the preferred-debt concept were used. Preferred debts are with rare exceptions based on statutes, and not on the carrying out of the intentions
of creditors and debtors.
WHAT SOLUTION IS PREERABLE ON THI BASIS Or
ECONOMIC POLICy?
If it be conceded that the parties to the collection transaction have
not themselves established a preference or placed the risk of loss
by virtue of a properly expressed intention, there remains the question whether there are economic reasons for granting a preference
or fixing the loss on a particulAr party by means of a statute. From
the view-point of commercial expediency and "policy, upon whom
should a statute cast the losses occurring- through the failure of collecting banks after collection but before credit or remittance? Does
the placing of the loss in the most practical and expedient manner
involve the use of a preference against the failed bank? .
These losses might, if one were starting de novo to frame a code,
be placed upon any one of several individuals or groups, namely:
(a) upon the forwarder of the item for collection;
(b) upon the original depositor of the item for collection;
(c) upon the debtor who sought to pay his debt by use of the
item which was forwarded for collection;
(d) upon the general creditors of the failed collecting bank;
(e) jointly upon the two parties who sought to pay and collect
a debt by the use of the item collected;
(f) upon the whole commercial-paper-using class of the country, or of a certain section of the country, who get the
benefit of the clearing and collection system.
These suggestions will be taken up for comment in order.
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(a) If the loss were thrown on the forwarding bank, unless prohibited by statute, the forwarding bank would pass the loss back to
the depositor of the item, as it generally does now, by means of an
agreement forced upon such depositor. Or.if prevented from shifting the loss ifithis way, the forwarding bank would transfer the
loss to those using its collection facilities by making larger charges
for collection. This process would also enable the bank to protect
itself against future losses by some form of insurance. The forwarding bank would not permanently bear the'loss. It would ultimately
fall on the individual depositor for collection, or on the depositors
of that bank as a class. The latter' result would make collecting more
expensive, and would hence slightly obstruct the use of commercial
paper as an equivalent of currency.
The Federal Reserve banks protect themselves against liability
arising out of the failure of collecting banks by express provision in
their notices to member and non-member clearing banks.40
It would seem unjust and inexpedient to place any final or ultimate liability on any bank taking part in the collecting .process. The
collection system of the country is one in which the banks are mere
conduits, or media, for transmitting credit to or from the debtor
classes and from or to the creditor classes. The banks are either
paid nothing directly for performing this service, or are paid small
sums which are merely sufficient to cover part of the postage, bbokkeeping and clerical expenses. Obviously the banks do receive benefits from the maintenance of checking accounts in that they thereby
secure means for lending money at a profit, and it may be urged that
the .banks do receive in this way sufficient indirect benefits to make
it just that they should assume the risk of the failure of their correspondents who are collecting items.
The banks can not reasonably be expected to collect in cash or'to
keep separate paper or credit received as the proceeds of collections.
Such separation would involve an enormous amount of labor and
bookkeeping which would impede business and require much gieater
-collection charges.
(b) If the loss is by statut- put on the- depositor of the item
for collection, he will shift the burden in his future contracts. He
4

OSee Bulletin 213, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Sept. 2, 1930.
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will compel his debtors to agree in advance that payient by paper
shall be subject to collection in full,-that payment shall not be complete until the paper is collected and its proceeds transmitted to the
creditor. This procedure is to some extent followed at present. Or
the depositor, and others of his class, will charge slightly more for
their goods or services so as to insure against collection risks.
(c) Much can be said for the position that a debtor does not
pay his debt by the use of commercial paper until the proceeds of
that paper reach his creditor. A Montana statute 1 has taken a position of this type. It is an accommodation to the debtor to be allowed
to pay by check or draft, instead of by currency. If he had to bear
this risk initially,, he could not shift it. He would not be strong
enough to compel a reduction by the creditor in the price of his goods
or services, to offset the debtor's risk.
(d) It is no doubt easiest to throw the loss on the general creditors of the failed bank. Most failed banks are small institutions,
in the country or in small cities. Their general creditors have individually relatively small claims. As a class they are not nearly as
influential with the legislatures as the forwarding city banks or the
city creditors. Before courts these general creditors are not present
personally, but are represented by a receiver who is not always especially interested in them. Perhaps the feeling is that they have to
lose anyway, and that it is not very material whether they lose a
little more or less. But it seems unjust to throw this burden on
these general creditors. *They were not connected with this collection transaction as beneficiaries in any way. They constitute only.a
small portion of the beneficiaries of the whole country-wide system
of collections.
Those who seek to justify a preference in favor of the depositor
of the item as against the general creditors of the failed bank advance certain arguments based on a higher or superior equity in favor
of the depositor. They say that the depositor of the item for collection is a. distant, involuntary, temporary creditor with no chance
to investigate the character of the bank in "question; whereas the gen41A recent act in Montana (sec. 61o8, Rev. Codes; L. 1925, c. 65) seems
to throw the loss through failure of a collection remittance on the debtor who
issued the paper sought to be collected. He remains liable on his debt, just as
if he had not issued paper to pay it, at least in certain cases.
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eral creditors of thefailed bank are to a large extent located near
the failed bank, voluntarily enter into the debtor-creditor relationghip,
are more or less permanent, loig-time creditors, and have an opportunity to investigate the character of the bank in question. Since
the contending claims of the depositor of the paper and general creditors of the failed bank are under the present assumption not'equitable in type, these arguments would not seem to be sufficient to
move a court or to justify a judicial decision. Any weight they may
have should affect legislation only. To the writer it seems that they
ought to have little weight in framing statute law. Both the depositor
of the paper and the general creditors of the forwarding bank have
seen fit to rely on the combnon debtor-creditor relationship.
Preferred debts are usually created by statute in the administratibn of the estates of deceased persons, insolvents, and the like, for
one of four reasons, namely: "(i) to care for the expenses of the
administration of the estate; (2) to satisfy governmental claims;
"(3) to pay persons who have rendered particularly meritorious services or, have particularly meritorious claims, as in the case of funeral
expenses, expenses of the last illhess, or claims of a widow or children; and (4) to secure payment to those in'a low economic position as, for example, laborers, household servants and the like. It
would not. seem that the depositor of the item for collection deserves
&42
preference on any of these grounds.
42For" examples of statutory prefeftnent of claims against insolvent banks,.
see Carroll's Ky. Stat. I93O, sec. 165a-7 (expenses, of liquidation and preferred
claims; secured claims to the extent of- the security; all 'other debts; stockholders) ; Mont. ,.' 1927, c. 89, sec. 134 (expenses of liquidation, all funds
held by the. bank in trust; funds- of other banks in process of liquidation and
deposited with the particular failed bank'by the Superintendent of Banks before insolvency, general liquidated debts, unliquidated claims); N. C. . L.
1927, c. 113; ec. i (taxes and fees due the state, wages and salaries due officers and employees for four months last past; expenses of liquidation; certifidd checks and cashier's checks for collected items). For a typical statute
regarding claims against dicedent's etates, sed Smith-Hurd Ill. Stat., C. 3, sec.
71 (funeral expenses and expenses' of administration, widow's and children's
award, expenses of last sickness and clafns of laborers and household servants,
debts due.the comrnon school fund or township, trust funds unaccounted for,
all other claims).- Sec. IO4 of the federal Bankruptcy Act prefers claims as
follows:- the expense of preserving tie estate, filing fees and the expense of
recovering property," costs -of administratidii, expenses -of opposing a composi-

tion, wages of workmen, clerks, salesmen or servants for a limited period,
taxes due the United States, a state, or- subdivision of a state.
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(e) A strong argument can be made for placing the loss frohi
the failure of the collecting bank equally on the two parties who
were to be the beneficiaries of the particular collection transaction.
One of them sought the benefit of the bankers' collection system in
order to pay his debt, the other in order to collect a debt. If the
transaction had been successful, each would have received an advantage in the facility with which the debt was paid. Since the collection transaction failed in part, without the fault of either creditor
or debtor, should they not jointly bear the loss? A weakness of this
suggestion is, no doubt, that provisions for carrying it out would be
,cumbersome. To divide the loss between two persons requires more
machinery than to place the .loss on one party. Probably the result
might best be accomplished by obliging the depositor of the paper
for collection to prove as a general creditor against the failed bank,
and then give him a cause of action against his old debtor, who
had used the item to pay his debt, for one-half the loss sustained by
the failure of the collecting fiank. This would involve two actions
or proceedings instead of one. The remedy against the maker -or,
drawer of the collected paper in favor of the depositor for collectidn
might well be illusory, because of the bank failure. All his assets
might be eaten up by that disaster. If the maker or drawer objected
that this joint responsibility would make him pay part'of his debt
a second time, the answer could often be given that he paid his debt
by giving up a claim against an insolvent bank, and that this claim,
if retained, would very shortly have been worth much less than par.
(f) A fairly strong argument on principle can be made for placing the risk of losses in collections on the whole class of beneficiaries
of the country's collection system. It is the whole commercial class
which gives and receives checks, drafts and other paper and which
gets the benefit of the collection system. A very large percentage of
the business of the country is done by paper and not by the use of
currency. The commercial class, the buyers and sellers, lenders and
borrowers, and others, get the great benefits in convenience, safety,
and speed from the use of this paper system and its necessary concomitant, the bankers' collection system. The losses from failed collecting banks afe necessary elements of this collection system, just as
physical injuries to workmen are inevitable consequences of the modern manufacturing and industrial system. Just as the workmen's
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compensation acts and similar legislation have placed these .losses
due to workmen's injuries on the employers, to be shifted by them
to the customers of such employers through the media of highe
prices, so a collection code might properly set up machinery for placing collection losses on the commercial classes which benefit from
the use of commercial paper and the collection system. Here, again,
the objection of impracticality, can, of course, be made. How provide for the distribution of these losses over the entire class using
commercial paper? A possible procedure for accomplishing something of this effect would be to place the loss initially on the forwarding bank and allow it to distribute this loss through charges
made to its customers for future collection or other banking service.
Naturally banks are not desirous of undertaking this distribution,
since it would doubtless occasion some friction between them and
their customers.
As shown by the cases and statutes cited above, the distinct modem tendency is to throw the loss on the general creditors of the
failed bank, persons who are not at all the beneficiaries of the particular collection transaction and are" a relatively weak and minor
class of the beneficiaries of the whole collection system of the country. This seems to the writer the least defensible result of the several possible choices.
Either placing the loss on the depositor of the item for collection or on the forwvarding bank seems preferable on principle. Procedures for working out either of these results are practical. The
depositor would shift his loss to his customers as a whole. The forwarding bank would distribute its loss among its depositors as a
whole.
The only solution requiring a preference against the failed bank
is that of placing the loss on the creditors of the failed bank. Here
the preference, if resort must be had to it, can be worked out best
on the basis of a preferred debt established by statute, or an equitable lien declared by statute. The illogical use of the trust terminologi to accomplish the preference should be avoided. It works a
detriment to the trust institution. It is not necessary if a federal
statute is adopted to cover claims against national banks. 43
43

Under sec. 194 of the present federal banking act the rule for distribution of the assets of a failed national bank seems to be one of absolute equality,
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'CONCLUSIONS

I. The present' tendency of decisions and statutes to place collection losses on the general creditors of failed collecting banks and
to give a preference to a forwarder on a trust theory is to be deplored.
2. Such losses should be borne ultimately by as large a class of
the commercial community as possible, and should be distributed to
such class by the depositor for collection or the forwarding -bank.
No preference out of the assets of the failed bank is necessary to
accomplish this placing and distribution of loss.
even as to claims owed to the United States with one slight exception. 'Cook
County National Bank v. United States, io7 U. S. 445. A state statute attempting to give a preference against a defunct national bank, contrary to the
federal statute, would be unconstitutional. Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, i6I
U. S. 275; Steele v. Randall, I9 F.(2d) 40; Fiman v. State of South Dakota,
29 F.(2d) 776; Palo Alto County v. Ulrich, i99 Iowa I; Central National
Bank v. First National Bank, 219 N.W. 894. An attempt by a state statute
to give a preference again'st an insolvent national bank by declaring that the
national bank was a trustee when it was not intended to be such and the primary elements of a trust were lacking, should be treated as a mere subterfuge,
as an effort to do indirectly what the state could not do directly.
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